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1 Introduction 
Various types of faults arise in industrial processes ow- 
ing to malfunction of internal components of a process as 
well as those in measurement sensors and control actua- 
tors attached to the process. Over the last three or four 
decades industrial automation has been increasingly fu- 
eled by various technological developments including the 
availability of highly complex electronic equipment and 
the overwhelming progress in computer technology. This 
has led not only to the development of complex control 
systems but also to higher demand of reliable and secure 
control systems° Thus it has become imperative that any 
fault that occurs be detected and identified automatically 
without severely disturbing the yield the process gener- 
ates. This has stimulated over the last two decades an ex- 
tensive study of fault detection and isolation methods. 
As discussed in a survey paper by Willsky, [5], one faces 
three different ypes of tasks or layers in the area of fault 
detection and isolation, (1) fault detection, (2) fault iso- 
lation, and (3) fault estimation. Fault detection consists 
of designing a residual generator that produces a resid- 
ual signal enabling one to make a binary decision as to 
whether a fault occurred or not. Fault isolation imposes 
a stronger equirement. When one or more faults occur, 
the residual signal must enable us not only to detect hat 
there are faults occurring in the system, but it must also 
enable us to identify (isolate) which faults have occurred. 
Finally, fault estimation is the determination of the extent 
of failure. The latter is done by trying to reconstruct the 
fault signals. 
A number of fundamental problems that arise in fault esti- 
mation, i.e. in estimating the fault signals have been stud- 
ied recently by us [1 ]. We also studied fault detection and 
fault isolation in the paper [2]. 
However, an issue which, as far as we know, has not been 
studied in this context is to estimate and minimize the time 
it takes after a fault occurs to actually detect he fault on 
the basis of the residual signal. 
For discrete-time systems, the notion of using a fixed de- 
lay in estimating a fault signal has been introduced in [1 ]. 
That is, at time step k, one obtains the estimate of the 
fault signal at k - g where g is a fixed nonnegative integer. 
This clearly weakens the solvability conditions. In [2] we 
looked into using this delay for fault detection and iso- 
lation and we noted this does not weaken the solvability 
conditions. However, this is due to a fundamental spect 
of our problem formulation° In fault detection we required 
the residual signal to be nonzero if a fault occured and oth- 
erwise to be zero. However, we did not impose any con- 
straint on the time between the occurence of a fault and the 
moment hat the residual signal becomes nonzero indicat- 
ing that a fault has occured. Obviously in many applica- 
tions this delay in detecting a fault can be quite dangerous 
and therefore this delay should be as small as possible. 
In this paper we show that if fault detection and isolation is 
possible for continuous time systems, then we can make 
the delay arbitrary small. However, in discrete time this 
delay will in the worst case be n timesteps for a system 
of McMillan degree n. We formulate in this paper only 
the problems of exact fault detection and isolation. In [2] 
we extended these results to generic and almost fault de- 
tection and isolation. The results of this paper also cover 
these cases but the presentation of these results in this con- 
ference paper are not possible due to space limitations. 
The following definitions will be needed later on: 
Definition 1.1 Consider a linear system E characterized 
by a quadruple (A, B, C, D). The strongly controllable 
subspace 4(A, B, C, D) is defined as the smallest sub- 
space o fR  n which is (A + K C)-invariant and containing 
im(B + g D). 
Definition 1,2 Consider a linear system Y; characterized 
by a quadruple (A, B, C, D). The system is said to be 
left invertibIe if the transfer matrix of the system has a left 
inverse (not necessarily proper or stable). 
Definition 1.3 Consider a linear system ~ characterized 
by a quadruple (A, B, C, D). The infinite zeros of this 
system are equal to the infinite zeros of the corresponding 
transfer matrix. 
Note that the order of the infinite zeros are determined 
through the Smith-McMillan form at infinity of the trans- 
fer matrix. 
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Problem Formulations and Main 
Results 
Consider the following state space description for a plant 
or a system given by 
~--a lll k 
crx -- Ax  + ~-,j=l E.id.] + Ei=l Li f i  
= Ax  + Ed  + L f f  
E : 
y = C x + Y"? ~-~.I = I Od, j d.i + ~:  I O.Li f i  
= Cx + Ddd + D. l f ,  
(2.1) 
d where o- is an operator indicating the time derivation 27 
for continuous-time systems and a forward unit time shift 
for discrete-time systems. Also, x E IR n is the state vec- 
tor, d ¢ R"* is a disturbance signal vector, and y ¢ tRP is 
the measurement vector. Furthermore, f i  signifies the i-th 
fault fox each i = l, 2 . . . . .  k. The coefficient matrices Li 
and D L i are referred to in the literature as failure signa- 
tures associated with the i-th fault, while f i  itself is called 
the i-th fault signal. Obviously, the failure signatures Li 
and D L i depend on the physics of the given system. The 
fault signal vector f E R ~ is a collection of fault sig- 
nals f i ,  i = 1,2 . . . . .  k, into a vector° We will sometimes 
need to refer to the fault signal f/ ~ IR ~ which is a vector 
with all elements equal to zero except for the i'th position 
where it is equal to f i .  Because there is no possibility for 
confusion and to simplify notation we will denote both j~ 
and ~ by f i .  It is always clear from the context which 
interpretation we are using. 
In modeling a given plant by the system (2.1), we as- 
sume that all the fault signals f i ,  i = 1,2 . . . . .  k, are 
quite arbitrary and that no information is known regard- 
ing their characteristics. That is, none of the signals 
i = 1,2 . . . . .  k, are constrained to belong to any special 
class of functions. 
We now proceed to formulate certain fault detection and 
isolation problems. The fault detection setup we follow 
here is shown in the following figure: 
f 
i 
i + 
d .i Plant Y ,- Residual generator I 
Let the residual signal r be given by 
r = Hy = qu (d, f )  (2.2) 
where r is a time function that takes values in Rq. In gen- 
eral, we might have to take H to be a nonlinear bounded- 
input, bounded-output s able operator which makes 
also a nonlinear operator mapping disturbances and faults 
to a residual signal r. Of course, if H is linear, then there 
exist transfer matrices Grf and Grd such that 
r = Gr . / f  + Grdd. 
One of the basic issues that concerns fault detection and 
isolation is whether one can achieve such a detection and 
isolation when the disturbance d affects the system. This 
points out a need to have a residual generator which is in- 
sensitive to the external disturbance d. That is, we need 
that 
(d, f )  = vp (0, f )  
for all disturbances d and all fault signals f or at least that 
the dependence of r on d is arbitrarily small with respect 
to some specified norm. If H is linear then this implies 
that we impose that the transfer matrix Grd iS zero or ar- 
bitrarily small in some specific norm. 
Before we proceed, we need to consider certain modeling 
aspects. In a given situation, there exists always a number 
of possible faults. Some of these individual faults might 
occur simultaneously at any given time and others cannot. 
The tasks of fault detection and isolation depend on which 
faults can occur simultaneously and which cannot. In this 
paper we consider the two extreme cases: either faults can 
occur simultaneously (without any restrictions) or faults 
cannot occur simultaneously, i.e. two faults never occur 
simultaneously. Moreover, in the latter case, faults occur 
sufficiently apart in time so that at any given time at most 
one fault affects the measurement signal. 
The subsection 2.1 defines the basic problems that cor- 
respond to fault detection, the subsection 2.2 defines the 
basic problems that correspond to fault isolation. 
2.1 Fau l t  detect ion  
As mentioned in the introduction, the task of fault detec- 
tion consists of designing a residual generator that pro- 
duces a residual signal enabling one to make a binary de- 
cision as to whether a fault or faults occurred or not. 
Problem 2.1 Consider the system given in (2.1). The pro- 
blem of (exact) fault detection of a set of multiple faults 
f with signature matrices L f  and Df  is defined as the 
problem of finding, if existent, a bounded-input bounded- 
output stable residual generator H whose output is a scalar 
residual signal r = q-'(d, f )  such that 
(i) ~ (d, 0) = 0 for all disturbances d.
(ii) ~(d ,  f )  # 0 for all faults f # 0 and all distur- 
bances d. 
We say that the set of multiple faults with signature matri- 
ces L f  and Df  is exactly detectable if the above problem 
is solvable for it. 
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2.2 Fault Isolation 
The task of fault detection exists only when there is a pos- 
sibility of multiple faults occurring. In that case, in ad- 
dition to detecting that a fault or faults occurred, one has 
to identify as to what individual fault or faults have oc- 
curred. Let us also emphasize that fault isolation can be 
sought at different levels. The most demanding level is the 
one that seeks to identify each and every individual fault 
that occurred. In certain aspects of engineering, one may 
not need to identify each and every individual fault that 
occurred. Perhaps, one can classify all possible faults into 
certain classes. Then, one needs simply to ascertain that 
a fault or faults belonging to a particular class or classes 
have occurred° 
In connection with fault isolation, it is important to recog- 
nize that the detectability of a set of faults must be ascer- 
tained before one faces the task of fault isolation. 
We first consider the case when we need to identify each 
and every individual fault that occurred. It is easy now 
to recognize that the task of isolating or identifying every 
individual fault requires that we generate for each individ- 
ual fault signal fi a dedicated residual signal r i such that 
ri would be insensitive to all disturbances and all vector 
faults for which ~ is identical to zero while it is sensitive 
to all vector faults for which fi is not identical to zero. 
It is clear fiom this discussion that, for the task of indi- 
vidual fault isolation, the dimension of residual vector can 
always be taken the same as the dimension of fault vector 
f itself. 
We can now have the following precise formulation of 
fault isolation problem that seeks to identify each individ- 
ual fault that occurred. 
Problem 2.2 Consider the system given in (2. l) under the 
simultaneous occurrence property. Then, the problem of 
(exact) individual fault isolation for a set of faults f with 
signature matrices L f  and Df  is defined as a problem of 
finding, if existent, a bounded-input bounded-output sta- 
ble residual generator H which generates a residual vector 
r = qU(d, f )  such that for any fault f i ,  i = 1,2 . . . . .  k, 
there exists a dedicated component ri of r and the operator 
~i from d and f to ri has the following properties: 
• qJi (d, f )  = 0 for any disturbance d and any fault f 
such that ~ is identical to zero. 
• qJi(d, f )  ¢: 0 for any disturbance d and any fault f 
such that fi is not identical to zero. 
The set of faults f with signature matrices L f  and Df is 
said to be individually identifiable if the problem of indi- 
vidual fault isolation is solvable. 
2.3 Delays in fault detection and isolation 
For ease of presentation we define the class of all causal 
signals as .8c., i.e. f ~ 4c. if and only if f ( t )  = 0 for all 
t<O.  
Assume we have a residual generator H yielding a resid- 
ual signal ro We have: 
r = Hy = ~(d,  f )  (2.3) 
Assume that this residual generator achieves exact fault 
detection. That is, 
® ~ (d, 0) -- 0 for all d 
® qJ(d, f )  is nonzero for all d and for all nonzero f° 
Then we can define the detection delay dH: 
dH :=  sup sup inf{ t I r(t) ¢ 0} 
.f e-&. d 
.s<,~o 
Note that dH >~ 0 by causality of the system. Theoreti- 
cally dH could be equal to +oc  but in any normal design 
this detection delay will be finite, dH gives the worst case 
delay in detecting a fault and obviously we would like to 
minimize this delay. 
For fault isolation we again consider a residual generator 
H and define ~ according to (2.3). Assume that this resid- 
ual generator achieves exact fault isolation. Then we can 
again define the isolation delay 
iH : - -  sup sup supinf{t [ ri(t) # 0} 
i=l ..... m./'6~c d 
.D -#o 
Note that again iH)  0 by causality of the system and the- 
oretically could be equal to +oo. i H gives the worst case 
delay in detecting and isolating a fault and obviously we 
would like to minimize this delay. 
The following theorems gives a positive result for contin- 
uous time systems in the sense that we can always guar- 
antee iH = 0 and dH = 0. These results are independent 
of the fact whether or not fault can occur simultaneously 
or not. 
Theorem 2.3 Assume that fault detection is possible for a 
continuous-time system of the form (2.1). Then there also 
exists a residual generator which achieves fault detection 
and is such that d H = O. 
Theorem 2.4 Assume that fault isolation is possible for a 
continuous-time system of the form (2.1). Then there also 
exists a residual generator which achieves fault isolation 
and is such that i H = O. 
However, for discrete-time systems the situation is quite 
different. In order to present hese results we make a de- 
composition of the state space 3C = 3el @ X2 with 3(;1 = 
~* (A, E, C, D~) and a decomposition of the output space 
-- ~1 O ~2 with ~1 = C~3*(A, E, C, Dd) + im Dd. 
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For details we refer to [3, 4]. With respect o this decom- 
position the system takes the following form for suitably 
chosen K I and K2: 
x+ d+ f 
A22 L2 
+ y (2°4) 
K2 
We denote the columns of L2 and D.L2 by L2,i and D.L2,i 
respectively. 
Theorem 2.5 Consider She system (2°4)° We have the fol- 
lowing results: 
• Assunze faults can occur simultaneously. Fault 
detection is possible if and only if the system 
(A22, L2, C22, D.L2) is left invertible. MoreoverdH 
is equal to the maximal order of the infinite zeros of 
the system (A22, L2, C22, D.L2). 
• Assume faults cannot occur simultaneously° Fault 
detection is possible if and only if the transfer 
matrix of the system (A22, L2, C22, D.L2) has no 
colunms identical to zero. Moreover dH is equal 
to the maximal order of the infinite zeros of the sys- 
tems (A22, L2,i, C22, DL2,i) for i = 1 . . . .  k. 
Theorem 2.6 Consider the system (2.4). We have the fol- 
lowing results." 
• Assume faults can occur sinzuItaneously. Fault 
isolation is possible if and only if the system 
(A22, L2, C22, D L2) is left invertible. Moreover iH 
is equal to the maximal order of the infinite zeros of 
the system (A22, L2, C22, D L2). 
• Assume faults cannot occur simultaneously. Fault 
isolation is possible if and only if the system 
(A22, (L2,i L2,j) , C22, (Df,2,i D.L2,j) ) 
(2.5) 
is left invertible for all i, j = 1 . . . . .  k with i 7/= j. 
Moreover dH is equal to the maximal order of the 
infinite zeros of the systems (2.5)for i, j = 1 . . . . .  k 
with i 7k jo 
Note that from the above two theorems it is clear that if 
faults can occur simultaneously then fault detection is pos- 
sible if and only if fault isolation is possible and dH = ill. 
On the other hand, if faults cannot occur simultaneously 
then the solvability conditions for fault detection and iso- 
lation are different and in general dH ¢= iHo 
The following example illustrates that iH and dH can be 
different and also that the delay can be influenced by 
whether or not faults can occur simultaneously. 
Example 2.7 Consider the following system: 
-2  0 0 0 1 
1 -2  3 
i ° i + 1 f 0 
1 2 1 3 1 
i ' ° i i 
Y= 0 1 x+ d 
0 0 
2 3 8 
+ 0 f 
0 
The decomposition as presented in (2.5) is quite trivial in 
this case with K l and K2 equal to zero and 3(;1 and ~l 
equal to the one dimensional subspace of the state and out- 
put space respectively which is spanned by the first unit 
vector. We obtain: 
• If faults can occur simultaneously then fault detec- 
tion and isolation is possible and dH =iH = 3. We 
can see that a delay i14 is inevitable by condidering 
the case: 
1 k =0 
f l (k )= 0 k:/=O 
t k =2 
f3(k) = 0 k 7/=0 
-1  k=l  
f2(k) -- 
o k¢O 
while 
d(k)=- (2  3 8) f - (1  2 1 3) x 
which yields y(0) = y(1) = y(2) = 0 and only 
y(3) = 1 gives the first indication that a fault has 
occured. 
• If faults cannot occur simultaneously then fault de- 
tection and isolation is possible and dH = 1 while 
iH=2.  
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3 Conclusion 
This paper studies an aspect of detection and isolation de- 
lays which has been ignored in many papers in this area. 
Surprising since it is highly relevant from a practical point 
of view. In continuous-time systems this is not a serious 
matter since we can always guarantee an arbitrary small 
deJay and nearly all designs in the literature yield this ar- 
bitrary small delay. However, for discrete-time systems 
the situation is different and by designing specifically to 
reduce the detection or isolation delay we can get better 
results compared to most designs as available in the liter- 
ature. 
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